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Strengthening the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) is a strategic objective for 
the EU in the coming years. The AFSJ was established in 1999 when the Council agreed a very 
ambitious programme of measures with tight deadlines to provide the EU with a common area in 
justice and home affairs to mirror the internal market.  However, in such s ensitive fields as 
criminal justice, policing and immigration (which are at the heart of  the AFSJ), legitimate 
concerns about national sovereignty and  civil liberties have emerged  opposing further EU 
integration. Amongst these, a considerable  number of EU constitutional courts have questioned or 
even rejected the European Arrest Warrant, a crowning achievement of the AFSJ; a variable 
constellation of member states have effectively snubbed EU initiatives by  making agreements to 
proceed independently on policing (for instance the Prüm Treaty or the Sarkozy initiative) and the 
issue of agreeing on  common standards of legal migration to the EU has reached an impasse. 
Where is the AFSJ going? 
The EU is at a crossroads: either it abandons the objective of integration in the AFSJ and 
leaves the field to member state sovereignty or it pushes ahead. But in the latter case, a change of 
strategy is imperative. While the member states in the Council express their enthusiasm for more 
AFSJ, individual ministries at the national level (and most commonly home affairs ministries) 
continue to act in their traditional fashion, which is at odds with the stated objectives. All too 
often, by the time the national experts from home affairs ministries have finished with an 
initiative in the field, it has been transformed so much that it provides either for the continuation   2 
of national practices without any integration (for instance measures on irregular immigration) or 
for one-sided integration privileging the coercive institutions without ensuring  equality of arms 
for the citizen (for instance the E uropean  Arrest  Warrant or EAW). In both cases there is 
resistance – either criticism that ‘Europe’ does nothing, or societal (expressed as judicial) disquiet 
regarding the protection of constitutional rights.  
The mechanisms for the adoption of measures in the AFSJ encourage both results by failing 
to provide sufficient centralising weight at the institutional level to counterbalance the voices of 
one set of ministries at the national level . While at the national level, the home affairs ministries 
must find consensus with other ministries such as justice, social affairs, development or education 
before proposing new national legislation, at the EU level the isolation of the AFSJ in the third 
pillar or a  ‘muffled’ first pillar
1  means that home affairs ministry concerns  are not 
counterbalanced  by other ministries responsible  for constitutional protection, social cohesion, 
development, education etc.  
What are the answers to these challenges? Two measures are imperative. First,  ‘more 
Europe’ through the expansion of  ‘the Community method’ to all the AFSJ areas is highly 
desirable if not inevitable. Without a change in the mechanisms by which the EU operates in 
AFSJ and the abolition of the current pillar structure, the AFSJ is not going to succeed. Secondly, 
strengthening the freedom dimension of AFSJ (rule of law and fundamental rights) in all areas is 
urgently required if the project is to be acceptable to the people of Europe.  
The second multi-annual programme on AFSJ, known as ‘the Hague Programme’, provides 
the political mandate and the overall policy agenda for the 2004–2009 period. A key error in the 
programme is its  presentation of ‘freedom’ and ‘security’ as antithetical  values and therefore 
requiring a ‘balancing procedure’ (i.e. the need to find the right balance between freedom and 
security). Its predecessor - the Tampere Programme of 1999 – rejected this understanding of the 
relationship between freedom and security:  “shared commitment to freedom based on human 
rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law” was the starting place.
2 ‘Securing rule of law’, 
                                                  
1 As Title IV EC, which incorporated immigration, asylum and borders into EC law, does not yet provide 
for full competence to the European Court of Justice and includes the participation of intergovernmental 
bodies such as SCIFA (Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum) in addition to 
COREPER, it does not yet come within the classic EU governance rules of the first pillar. 
2 See CHALLENGE, A Response to the Hague Programme: Protecting the Rule of Law and Fundamental 
Rights in the Next Five Years of an EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, r etrievable from 
www.libertysecurity.org.   3 
as rightly emphasised by the former UN Human Rights Commissioner Mary Robinson,
3 needs to 
be at the heart of the project. The moment that coercive security is divorced from the rule of law 
and balanced against freedom rather than understood as a flanking measure to secure freedom 
within the rule of law there is going to be trouble with the constitutional courts of the member 
states.  To exacerbate the problem, the Hague  Programme marginalises  the  protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms, fair and equal treatment of third country nationals and the key 
role of the European Court of Justice.
4 The Hague Programme does not offer the policy and 
institutional mechanisms necessary to create the AFSJ.  
There are two essential elements that the EU needs if it is effectively to meet the citizens’ 
agenda in the light of a failing Constitutional Treaty and  the deficiencies inherent to the Hague 
Programme:  
First, the structure: the AFSJ which currently (and uncomfortably) straddles the first and 
third pillars of the Union must be consolidated in the first pillar. The dismantling of the current 
pillar structure is a prerequisite for comprehensive, legitimate, efficient, transparent and 
democratic responses to the dilemmas posed by the Europeanisation processes and the creation of 
a common  AFSJ.  The European Commission has already suggested in its Communication 
2006/211 that it will make a proposal under Article 42 Treaty on European Union to this effect. 
The Finish Presidency should embrace this proposal and push forward its adoption. 
Paradoxically, ‘more Europe’ may be the only way to protect the principle of subsidiarity. More 
transparency by consolidating the whole of the AFSJ into one European  Community pillar will 
permit member states to have more control over all the policy developments in these fields. The 
shortage of input in the AFSJ from other ministerial areas such as social affairs, development and 
justice can only be remedied by a radical change in the decision-making process. The EU has a 
tried and  trusted system to ensure plurality of views: the Community method. Extending this 
system of decision-making to all AFSJ areas will also strengthen the protection of civil liberties 
and fundamental rights.  
Secondly,  the AFSJ needs to  make its commitment to ‘freedom’ based on human rights, 
democratic i nstitutions and the rule of law happen on the ground. To do this, the EU needs to 
adopt  its Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms as a legally binding instrument. The 
                                                  
3 See M. Robinson (2006) ‘ Five Years on from 9/11: Time to Reassert the Rule of Law’, Justice, 
International Rule of Law Lecture, Middle Temple Hall: London, 20 March 2006. 
4 UK Parliament, House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, The Hague Programme: A 
Five-year Agenda for EU Justice and Home Affairs, Report with Evidence,  10
th Report, HL Paper 84, 
Session 2004-05, London, 23 March 2005, pp. 11-13 and p. 34.   4 
incorporation of the charter into the EU’s legal framework is vital in order to give legal weight to 
those rights which are at the core of the EU and in whose name the AFSJ acts are being  carried 
out. A uniform legal framework which incorporates fundamental rights as norms of Europe is 
obligatory, not merely desirable . 
These two steps also resolve a number of the problems of democratic control: the European 
Parliament which has a full part in the decision-making process under the Community method; 
and judicial oversight: the European Court of Justice has competence to interpret issues of EC law 
(though the restriction regarding referrals from national courts found in article 68 and applying 
only to AFSJ matters needs to be removed).  
In conclusion, we recommend two measures to the Finnish Presidency in the field of AFSJ: 
(1)  Support the Commission’s initiative to use article 42 TEU to transfer all the 
responsibilities of the third pillar into the first pillar; 
(2)  Promote the position, taken by the German government in 2000, that the EU 
Charter on Fundamental Rights be given immediate binding legal effect in the 
EU’s legal sphere. 